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Abstract
This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income
tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm
strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Tax-
payers act conditionally cooperative, as their evasion decision depends on the other agents’
compliance. We characterize an equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and
study the impact of tax and deterrence policies on compliance. Our analysis is then ex-
tended to the case of a society which consists of heterogenous communities where individual
evasion decisions are embedded in a complex social structure. In this scenario, behavior is
crucially influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this
framework, we discuss the role of belief management and belief leadership as alternative
policy tools.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, a huge body of empirical literature has emerged which highlights the
importance of tax morale – taxpayers’ attitudes, perceptions and moral values – for individual
evasion decisions.1 Tax evasion seems to be more than a risky gamble of rational individuals,
who trade off the costs from detection with the chance of getting away undetected (Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972).2 As expressed by Agnar Sandmo (2005, p.649), “people refrain from tax
evasion [...] not only from their estimates of the expected penalty, but for reasons that have to do
with social and morale considerations.’ ’ One crucial factor which systematically influences such
moral considerations is the (perceived) compliance of other taxpayers: Individuals, who believe
that most fellow citizens are honest, consider evasion as a more serious wrongdoing than those,
who presume tax evasion to be more widespread.3 As recently discussed by Frey and Torgler
(2006), this link also seems to be causal: Higher expectations about the level of evasion result,
ceteris paribus, in a lower tax morale (and not the other way around).
In this paper we take up these findings and incorporates tax morale into Allingham and
Sandmo’s (1972) analysis of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as an internalized social
norm for tax compliance (Elster, 1989). The norm works as a soft constraint on action which
render evasion ‘costly’. If a taxpayer deviates from the norm and conceals income, conduct is not
in line with the individual’s self-image as a ‘good’ member of society, who complies with societal
norms and expectations. The strength of the norm – and thereby the self-imposed sanctions
associated with a norm violation – is determined by two factors: First, by an exogenously given,
individual specific degree of norm internalization. Second, by the endogenously determined share
of evaders in the society. The more people deviate from the norm, the weaker the compliance
norm becomes. This creates an interdependency of evasion decisions. An increase in evasion
will trigger a bandwagon effect as it lowers the strength of the norm and thereby raises other
taxpayers’ disposition to dodge taxes. Hence, individuals act conditionally cooperative – they
condition their compliance on the behavior of other members of the society.4
We first discuss the policy implications of this framework for the case of a homogenous society.
In a next step, we extend our analysis to the case of a more structured society, consisting of
different subgroups. The strength of the social norm is not only determined by the behavior
among the own peers, but also by the compliance in other subgroups. Within such a structured
society, different communities can end up with quite different levels of tax compliance. Hence,
this framework captures community specific ‘tax subcultures’, as discussed in Lewis (1982).
Moreover, we show that group specific policy changes create spillovers on other communities.
The intuition for this result is that conditional cooperation works not only within but also
between groups. If, for example, looser tax enforcement among one specific group results in
more evasion, this creates an externality on the norm strength in other groups. The more a
community takes over the position of a social reference group, the more detrimental are norm
1Compare e.g. Alm et al. (1992), Alm and Torgler (2006), Baldry (1986), Ge¨rxhani and Schram (2005), Gu¨th
et al. (2005), Kirchler et al. (2003), Lewis (1982, 1986), Torgler and Schneider (2005). Compare also chapter 6
in Cowell (1990) and Torgler (2006).
2See Andreoni et al. (1998) and Cowell (1990) for comprehensive discussions of the classical evasion model.
3See e.g. Frey and Torgler (2006), Porcano (1988), Spicer and Hero (1985), Torgler and Schneider (2005).
4Compare Ga¨chter (2006) who provides a comprehensive survey of experimental as well as field evidence of
conditional cooperative behavior.
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violations within this group on the perceived norm strength in the rest of the society. In order
to maintain a strong social norm, it is therefore crucial to enforce a high level of tax compliance
among ‘morale leaders’, i.e. members of moral reference groups. If the ‘leaders’ adhere to the
norm, this will trigger conditional compliance among the ‘followers’. This last result can be
neatly linked to recent experimental evidence which studies the impact of leader behavior in
groups. Ga¨chter and Renner (2006), for example, show that higher contributions by a leader
(first-mover) in a sequential public good game make followers expect higher levels of cooperation.
In turn, this results in more contributions among the followers. The importance of such a leader-
follower interaction is also emphasized by Hammar et al. (2005). They report on a study by
the Swedish Tax Agency which found that “the most common argument legitimizing tax evasion
among Swedens is that those in leading positions in society violate the social norms” (p.5).
Comparing our approach to the standard model of tax evasion, we solve several shortcomings
of the latter. First, standard theory can not explain that a majority of households fully complies
with tax laws. As most fiscal systems are characterized by rather low audit rates and penalties,
a rational, immoral taxpayers with a reasonable degree of risk aversion should conceal at least
some income (Bernasconi, 1998). Obviously, we can account for the high levels of compliance
documented in many countries,5 once we allow tax morale to play a role. Second, the Allingham
Sandmo model can hardly explain huge differences in tax compliance between countries or
regions with comparable monetary incentives for evasion. Stated more provocatively, standard
theory fails to explain why ‘Palermo is not Milan and Stockholm is not Moscow’ (Rothstein,
2000). As noted above, the evasion decisions in our model are interdependent – taxpayers
will conceal more income, the more other taxpayers deviate from the compliance norm. This
behavioral pattern typically results in a multiplicity of equilibria. An economy with a given
tax and enforcement policy can either end up in a state with a strong social norm, where most
taxpayers pay all their taxes honestly, or a state with a weak social norm, where evasion is more
widespread. In this vein, a model with an endogenous norm strength provides one explanation
to the ‘Palermo-Milano puzzle’.
Thirdly, our model solves another weakness of the standard model. For the plausible as-
sumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the standard theory implies that higher taxes
will lead to a lower level of evasion. If the penalty imposed on detected evaders is proportional
to the concealed income, a tax increase does not trigger any substitution effect, as both the
gains from evasion as well as the costs (associated with a higher expected fine) rise (Yitzhaki,
1974). The negative income effect then makes taxpayers less willing to bear risks. Therefore,
they will conceal less income. We demonstrate that this counterintuitive result which is also at
odds with most empirical studies (e.g. Clotfelter, 1983), vanishes in our model, if individuals
are strongly affected by the social norm. Moral taxpayers conceal ‘too little’ income, such that
the marginal expected return from evasion is positive. Any tax increase then further raises the
marginal return from cheating and thereby provides an incentive to extend the level of evasion.
We can find a threshold, where this substitution effect outbalances the income effect and the
counterintuitive result turns around – evasion is then increasing in the tax rate.
5Compare e.g. Alm et al. (1992), Andreoni et al. (1998).
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Finally, our framework also allows for quite unusual responses to policy changes, if agents are
not perfectly rational in the formation of their beliefs about others’ behavior. If, for example,
a stricter deterrence policy is accompanied by a shock in agents’ beliefs such that they expect
a level of norm violations which is above the true level, these initially false beliefs can become
self-fulfilling. In the context of multiple equilibria, stricter deterrence could then trigger more
evasion. This finding also points out the role of belief management as an important policy
instrument (compare e.g. Fehr and Falk, 2002; Ga¨chter, 2006).
There are several other contributions which study behavioral models of tax evasion.6 Three of
them are closely related to our approach. Kim (2003) examines a model of stigmatization in case
of detected evasion. While the properties of his framework are similar to ours, he uses numerical
simulations to show results that we can derive analytically. Myles and Naylor (1996) consider
a social norm (respectively a social custom) for tax compliance. In contrast to our approach,
however, they assume that the disutility from a norm deviation is independent of the amount of
evasion. Their model suggests that those who cheat on taxes all choose an optimal level of evasion
as predicted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Hence, they neither capture heterogenous levels
of non-compliance nor a positive relationship between the tax rate and evasion. The analysis
by Gordon (1989) is most closely related to our study. The preference structure considered
in the present paper, however, is less specific than the one in Gordon (1989). In addition,
we provide a detailed examination of tax and deterrence policies in the context of interrelated
evasion decisions which is missing in Gordon (1989). Furthermore, neither Gordon (1989) nor
any other paper studies evasion in a multi-group setting or the role of belief management.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly present
the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model as a starting point for our analysis. In section 3 we
introduce a tax compliance norm and study individual evasions behavior within this framework.
Section 4 provides an equilibrium concept for a heterogenous population of taxpayers. In section
5, we extend our model to a society consisting of different subgroups, and demonstrate how group
specific policy measures cause spillovers on other subgroups of the society. The paper concludes
with the discussion of a policy application.
2 The Allingham-Sandmo Model
Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (hereafter labeled AS), we consider individuals with
an exogenous gross income y. Each taxpayer i decides on how much of this income to declare
and how much to conceal. Income concealed is labeled ei ∈ [0, y]. The declared income, y − ei,
gets taxed with a proportional income tax at rate τ . With a fixed probability p the evasion
gets detected. In this case, the tax evader has to pay the full taxes and a penalty which is
proportional to the taxes evaded (Yitzhaki, 1974). With probability 1− p the evasion remains
undetected and the evader only pays taxes on the declared income. The corresponding levels of
net income xi for state a – getting detected – respectively state b – escaping undetected – are
6E.g. Bordignon (1993), Cullis and Lewis (1997), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Falkinger (1995), Schnellenbach
(2006).
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given by
xai = x
a(ei) = y − (y − ei) τ − τei − τeis = (1− τ) y − τeis
xbi = x
b(ei) = y − (y − ei) τ = (1− τ)y + τei
where s > 0 denotes the penalty rate. The expected (monetary) utility from evasion is given by
the von Neumann-Morgenstern
E [u(x(ei))] = p u (xa(ei)) + (1− p) u(xb(ei)) (1)
with u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0. Agents choose e so as to maximize expected utility. Note that
this decision is equivalent to an optimal portfolio choice problem, as individuals decide on how
much of their income to declare – and thereby invest in a safe asset – and how much to conceal
– invest in a risky asset. The first- and second-order condition to this problem are given by
E [u]′ ≡ −psτ u′(xa) + (1− p) τ u′(xb) = 0, (2)
E [u]′′ ≡ p(sτ)2 u′′(xa) + (1− p) τ2 u′′(xb) < 0. (3)
Condition (2) characterizes eAS , the optimal level of income concealed. We will assume in the
following that such an interior solutions eAS ∈ [0, y] always exits.
Implicitly differentiating E [u]′ with respect to p and s, one can easily show that the level
of evasion decreases as tax enforcement becomes stricter, i.e. deAS/dp < 0 and deAS/ds < 0
respectively. The effect of a marginal increase in τ is given by
deAS
dτ
=
(1− p) τ u′(xb) [(y − e) (ρ(xb)− ρ(xa))− e (s+ 1) ρ(xb)]
−E [u]′′ (4)
where we made use of (2) and the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, ρ (x) =
−u′′(x)/u′(x). For the case of non-increasing absolute risk aversion ρ′ ≤ 0 and therefore ρ(xai ) ≥
ρ(xbi). Hence, the sign in the squared brackets in (4) is negative. We get the paradoxical result
deAS/dτ < 0. According to the AS-framework, taxpayers with constant or decreasing absolute
risk aversion conceal less income, if the tax rate rises. This counterintuitive finding is driven
by the structure of the fine. Here we follow Yitzhaki (1974), who assumes that the penalty is
assessed on the level of taxes evaded, rather than income concealed, as in the original AS paper.
An increase in taxes will therefore raise both, the marginal gain from undetected evasion, i.e.
taxes saved, as well as the marginal costs associated with higher fines in the case of detection.
In the optimum, these two effects exactly offset each other. There is no substitution effect and
the impact of a tax increase on the optimal evasion level is solely driven by the income effect.
In the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion, a rise in taxes will reduce evasion, as a lower
income makes taxpayers less willing to bear risks.
We take this finding as a benchmark, and show that it might vanish if taxpayers are not
only guided by monetary incentives but also by moral concerns as defined below. In order to
guarantee comparability of the analysis, we maintain the assumption of non-increasing absolute
risk aversion throughout the paper.
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3 A Social Norm for Tax Compliance
We now incorporate tax morale into the decision problem. Tax morale is modeled as an inter-
nalized social norm for tax compliance – or equivalently, a norm against evasion. Declaring all
income correctly is considered to be the ‘morally right’ behavior, while cheating on the taxes
represents a violation of a social norm. Each member of the society has internalized these moral
connotations to a certain degree. If a taxpayer conceals income, behavior is in conflict with
morals. Tax evasion is then accompanied by internal sanctions, associated with emotions like
guilt or remorse (Elster, 1989). The strength of these internal sanctions depends on the endoge-
nous strength of the norm. Following the literature (e.g. Akerlof, 1980), we assume that a norm
is perceived as stronger, the more people adhere to it. If tax evasion becomes more common, the
social norm is less powerful and individuals’ costs to deviate from the norm decline: It becomes
easier for taxpayers to justify their wrong-doing to themselves, the more other people violate
the societies’ code of conduct. As we have discussed in the introduction, this line of reasoning is
supported by ample empirical evidence which shows that individuals consider tax evasion more
justifiable, the more they believe that other citizens cheat on taxes (see e.g. Frey and Torger,
2006).
We considering the following additive preference structure
v (ei, θi) = E [u(x(ei))]− θi ei c(n). (5)
While E [u(.)] represents the expected utility defined in (1), θi ei c(n) capture the ‘moral costs’
of tax evasion, associated with emotional sanctions. Note that negative emotions are assumed to
occur irrespectively whether the evasion gets detected or not. Hence, there is no risk associated
with this latter payoff.7 Our approach further assume that individuals rationally trade off the
(expected) monetary benefits from evasion with the non-pecuniary costs from a norm violation.8
The costs of evasion depend on (i) θi ≥ 0, the individual specific degree of norm internaliza-
tion, as well as (ii) the continuous function c(n) which captures the strength of the norm for a
given share of tax evaders n in the society. We assume that 0 < c(n) < ∞ and c′(n) ≤ 0 for
n ∈ [0, 1]. The more taxpayer deviate from the norm, the lower are the moral costs of evasion.
Moreover, (iii) the moral costs are linearly increasing in ei, the amount of income concealed by
agent i.9
3.1 Optimal Evasion Decision
Taking the policy variables as well as the number of evaders n as given, an agent maximizes
v (ei, θi) with respect to ei. The first order condition for an interior solution is
−psτ u′(xai ) + (1− p) τ u′(xbi) = θi c(n). (6)
7In the case of stigmatization studied by Kim (2003), the non-monetary costs from evasion of course depend
upon whether an individual gets detected or not.
8Empirical evidence which supports this assumption is provided by e.g. Bosman and van Winden (2002),
Hopfensitz and van Winden (2006).
9Empirical support for the case that taxpayers distinguish between different levels of evasion is provided by
Aitken and Bonneville (1980) and Lewis (1986). Note further, that any non-linearity would only change our
results quantitatively.
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The second order condition is equivalent to (3). As the left hand side of (6) equals E [u]′ from
(2), we can express condition (6) as E [u]′ = θi c(n). Norm guided taxpayers will choose a level
of evasion such that E [u]′, the marginal expected utility, equals θi c(n), the marginal moral costs
from an increase in the level of income concealed. Homo oeconomicus does not care about norms
or morals, i.e. θi = 0. Such an agent chooses an optimal portfolio according to (2), increasing
evasion up to the point where the marginal expected utility is equal to zero. This yields the
level of evasion predicted by the AS framework, eAS . In contrast, taxpayers with high levels of
θi may be in a corner solution and refrain from evasion. Let us define the marginal expected
utility for the first unit of evasion,
z ≡ E [u (x(0))]′ = (1− p (1 + s)) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) , (7)
with z > 0.10 From (3) and (6) it then follows that taxpayers with θic(n) > z do not conceal
any income. From this follows the threshold
θˆ(n) ≡ z
c(n)
, (8)
which allows us to characterize the optimal individual evasion behavior eˆi for a given level of n:
eˆi =
0 for θi > θˆ(n)e∗i for θi ≤ θˆ(n) . (9)
Individuals with θi > θˆ(n) will stick to the compliance norm. On the other hand, those with θi ≤
θˆ(n) will choose an interior solution e∗i according to condition (6). A graphical representation
of the optimal evasion level is provided below.
Figure 1: Optimal Evasion with a Social Norm
Figure 1 pictures expected utility as well as the marginal moral costs of evasion on the
10For z < 0 there would have to hold (1− p (1 + s)) < 0. If this were the case, evasion would not be a ‘fair
gamble’, in the sense that concealing income yields a negative expected return. The enforcement policy would be
deterrent, as no taxpayer would conceal any income.
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vertical axis against income concealed, plotted on the horizontal axis.11 While an agent with
θi = θˆ(n) will adhere to the compliance norm, taxpayers with θi = 0 will choose eAS which
maximizes the expected utility E[u]. Individuals with 0 ≤ θi ≤ θˆ(n), however, will choose an
intermediate level of evasion, e∗i ∈ [0, eAS ]. Note that e∗i depends – next to the policy variables
p, s, τ , income y and norm sensitivity θi – also on the n, the share of evaders in a society. Hence,
evasion decisions are interdependent. Before we characterize an equilibrium which accounts for
this interdependency in the next section, we first provide a brief comparative static analysis.
3.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Let us treat for the moment the frequency of evaders n as an exogenous variable. Applying the
implicit function theorem on (6) we then get
∂e∗i
∂p
=
sτ u′(xai ) + τ u
′(xbi)
E [u]′′
< 0, (10)
∂e∗i
∂s
=
pτ (u′(xai )− sτe∗i u′′(xa))
E [u]′′
< 0, (11)
∂e∗i
∂θi
=
c(n)
E [u]′′
< 0, (12)
∂e∗i
∂n
=
θi c
′(n)
E [u]′′
≥ 0, (13)
with E [u]′′ as defined in (3). As in the AS framework, stricter enforcement will reduce evasion.
Raising the penalty or the audit rate will induce agents to declare more income. Next to the
formal tax enforcement institution, also the social norm has a deterrent effect: An exogenous
shock in the norm sensitivity θi will result in a lower level of evasion. In terms of figure 1, the
θic(n) line would shift upwards and e∗i would decline. Furthermore, (13) shows that taxpayers
condition their evasion on the behavior of others. As more people evade taxes, agents with
0 < θi ≤ θˆ(n) react by concealing more income. The more taxpayers deviate from the compliance
norm, the weaker is the social norm, the lower are the moral cost of concealing. In this sense, any
new tax evader creates a positive externality on all other cheaters – it makes their wrong-doing
more justifiable, and thereby provides an incentive to evade more. From (8) we can derive
∂θˆ(n)
∂n
= −θˆ(n)c
′(n)
c(n)
≥ 0 (14)
since c′(n) ≤ 0. With a higher level of n, the compliance threshold θˆ(n) rises. Some agents with
θi ≥ θˆ(n), who used to refrain from evasion, will start to conceal income after an increase in n.
These taxpayers condition their compliance with the tax law on the behavior of others. They
act as conditional cooperative taxpayers. We will elaborate on the implications of this behavior
in the following section.
11While in general E [u]′ is non-linearly decreasing in ei, we plotted a linear form for the sake of graphical
simplicity.
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Let us now turn to the impact of a tax increase. From (6) we obtain
∂e∗i
∂τ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (15)
Note that for θi = 0 the first term in the curly brackets is zero, and the right hand side is
equivalent to the effect derived in the AS framework, depicted in (4). In this case, we would get
∂e∗i /∂τ < 0. However, for positive values of θi the result might turn around. In Appendix A1,
we derive from (15) a threshold θ˜(n), such that
∂e∗i
∂τ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜(n)< 0 for θi < θ˜(n) (16)
While for low levels of θi the counterintuitive effect from the AS model carries over to our
framework, the result turns around for agents with a sufficient strong tax morale: As θi > θ˜(n)
we get the more plausible result that tax evasion increases with a higher tax rate. Moreover, in
the appendix we show that θ˜(n) is increasing in the levels of norm deviations. The lower the
share of tax evaders in the society, the lower is θ˜(n) and thereby ∂e∗i /∂τ ≥ 0 holds for a broader
range of θ-values. Note, however that non-increasing absolute risk aversion implies θ˜(n) > 0.
Hence, there is always a range θ ∈ [0, θ˜(n)] where the counterintuitive comparative static from
AS carries over to our framework.
The intuition for this finding is straightforward. As we have discussed above, a tax increase
will raise the marginal benefits from evasion, as well as the marginal costs (associated with higher
expected fines). For the optimal evasion level predicted by AS these two effects offset each other.
There is no substitution effect and the income effect from higher taxation triggers a reduction
in the evasion level. In our context, however, we find a positive substitution effect for all agents
with θi > 0 (depicted in the first term in the curly brackets in (15)). These agents will choose
an evasion level such that E [u]′ > 0. Marginal expected benefits from concealing are above
marginal expected costs. In terms of optimal portfolio choice, moral taxpayers ‘over-invest’ into
the safe asset – they conceal too little and declare too much income. Any increase in the tax
rate then raises the wedge between marginal expected benefits and cost even further. This raises
marginal expected utility E [u]′ for all agents with θi > 0 (respectively e∗i < e
AS). As we have
assumed moral costs of evasion to depend on income concealed rather than taxes evaded, these
costs are not affected by a tax change. Hence, the substitution effect provides a clear incentive
to increase evasion.12 While the negative income effect is still present, the positive substitution
effect dominates for θi > θ˜(n). For these agents, tax evasion increases as taxes rise. Note that
this result is not new in the literature. Our analysis solely replicates the result from Gordon
(1989) in a more compact framework.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the partial equilibrium effects associated with
an increase in the tax rate. From the definition of z above, one can easily derive ∂z/∂τ > 0.
From the AS model we know that E [u]′ evaluated at eASi decreases with an increase of the tax
rate. Hence, the E [u]′ curve turns clockwise as we increase τ , with the turning-point somewhere
12If moral costs would depend on the level of taxes evaded, a higher tax rate would also raise the evasion costs.
As long as the increase in marginal expected utility dominates the increase in costs, we would still observe a raise
in the evasion level for some levels of θ.
8
Figure 2: Partial Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase
between eASi and ei = 0. (Note that this also implies 0 < θ˜(n) < θˆ.) The intersection of the
marginal expected utility curve before and after the change in the tax rate defines the threshold
θ˜(n). In the example from figure 2, individuals with θi < θ˜(n) will reduce evasion as the tax
rate raises. The taxpayer with e.g. θ1 > θ˜(n), however, will conceal more income. Moreover,
taxpayer 2, who has been paying all taxes honestly before the tax increase, will switch to an
interior solution after the policy change. From this example one can also see that a change in
one policy variable typically has an impact on the share of evaders. In the following we study
this effect in an equilibrium framework.
4 Social Equilibrium
We consider a continuum population with unit mass. The norm parameter θ is distributed
according to a continuously differentiable, cumulative distribution function F (θ) which has full
support on the interval [0, θ¯]. The corresponding density function is f(θ) and the inverse of the
distribution function is denoted F−1(n). As we know from (9), people choose to evade taxes
if θi ≤ θˆ(n). The equilibrium population share of evaders n∗ is then given by the fixed-point
equation
n∗ = F
(
z
c(n∗)
)
(17)
The right hand side of (17) is a continuous function in n, mapping the compact interval [0, 1]
into itself. Assuming θ¯c(1) ≥ z assures that there always exists at least one asymptotically
stable equilibrium n∗ ∈ (0, 1],13 where stability is given iff
∂F−1(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
≥ ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∗
. (18)
13The existence of an equilibrium hinges on θ¯ ≥ θˆ(1) as well as θˆ(0) > 0. Note, that an equilibrium with n∗ = 0
is not supported, as we allow for taxpayers with θi = 0 who always choose to evade e
AS > 0 for any level of n.
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For an exogenous policy P =(τ, p, s), an equilibrium characterizes a self supporting share of
evaders. For n∗, the strength of the norm is such that a population share of 1− n∗ will declare
their income honestly, while the remaining n∗ will choose an interior solution e∗i as characterized
by (6). While there is at least one solution to (17), the system is typically characterized by a
multiplicity of equilibria. Such a case is illustrated in figure 3. If evasion has become prevalent,
the compliance norm has practically eroded and society finds itself in an equilibrium where
nearly everybody cheats on taxes. For the same policy P and distribution F (θ), however, the
society could in principle coordinate on a different equilibrium, where most agents adhere to the
norm. The social norm would be stronger and the level of tax evasion in the society would be
smaller.
Figure 3: Social Equilibrium – Impact of a Tax Increase
In figure 3 we plot the share of norm violators n on the horizontal axis against the degree of
norm internalization θ respectively the threshold θˆ(n) on the vertical axis. In the example, we
consider a uniform distributed of θ. The shape of θˆ(n) is defined by the function c(n). In figure
3 there are two asymptotically stable equilibria – a ‘good’ one, where only a small fraction n∗l
deviates from the norm and a ‘bad’ equilibrium with widespread evasion, n∗h. Between these
two stable equilibria, there is a third, instable one, with n∗m. Such instable equilibria mark
the boundaries of a stable equilibriums’ basin of attraction. In our example, society would
converges into the good equilibrium, starting from any share n ∈ [0, n∗m], respectively into the
bad equilibrium, for any n ∈ [n∗m, 1]. We will come back to this point in section 4.3.
4.1 Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase
Let us take a look at the equilibrium effect of an increase in the tax rate. As already addressed
above, individuals with θi > θˆ(n) may switch from a corner solution to an interior solution after
a tax increase. These new evaders will weaken the social norm, moral costs of evasion decline
and further taxpayers will start concealing income. The equilibrium effect is captured by an
upward shift of the θˆ(n)-curve in figure 3: the marginal expected utility from concealing the
first unit of income increases (∂z/∂τ > 0). Accordingly, the evasion threshold θˆ(n) rises for any
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n which results in an increase in the stable equilibrium share of evaders. Analytically, we can
derive this from (17) and get
dn∗
dτ
> 0 (19)
for any stable equilibrium (see Appendix A2). The equilibrium impact on the optimal level of
evasion is then given by
de∗i
dτ
=
∂e∗i
∂τ
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dτ
(20)
with ∂e∗i /∂n and ∂e
∗
i /∂τ from (13) respectively (15). As we have shown above in (16), the sign
of the first order effect is ambiguous and depends on the norm parameter θi. In contrast, the
second order effect is unambiguously positive for all θi > 0. We can derive a new threshold
θ˜∗(n∗) (see Appendix A2) such that
de∗i
dτ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜∗(n∗)< 0 for θi < θ˜∗(n∗) (21)
In equilibrium, there are now two effects which tend to raise evasion. First, there is a positive
substitution effect, discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis above. Second, a tax increase is
accompanied by an increase in the equilibrium share of norm breaking individuals. This second
effect lowers the moral cost of evasion and thereby provides a further incentive to conceal more
income. For taxpayers with θi ≥ θ˜∗(n∗) these two effects dominate the negative income effect –
they will react with more evasion on an increase in the tax rate. From this discussion also follows
that θ˜∗ < θ˜ for any n∗.14 Hence, compared to the partial equilibrium analysis, de∗i /dτ ≥ 0 holds
for a broader range of θ-values.
4.2 Equilibrium Effect of Deterrence Policies
We now turn to the impact of the tax enforcement variables s and p on the equilibrium share
of evaders as well as on the equilibrium level of evasion. From (17) we derive in Appendix A2
that in a stable equilibrium there holds
dn∗
dp
< 0,
dn∗
ds
< 0. (22)
As the deterrence policy becomes stricter, the marginal expected utility from evasion – and
therefore also z – falls; thereby, also the threshold θˆ(n) decreases (compare (7) respectively (8)).
The θˆ(n)-curve shifts downward and the population share of evaders drops. Using (22), we then
get the equilibrium impact of a stricter enforcement policy,
de∗i
dp
=
∂e∗i
∂p
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dp
< 0, (23)
de∗i
ds
=
∂e∗i
∂s
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
ds
< 0 (24)
Additional to the first-order effects ∂e∗i /∂p and ∂e
∗
i /∂s derived above in (10) and (11), the
deterrence policy now has a second order effect. As auditing becomes more frequent or if the
14As this new effect is strictly positive, de∗i /dτ > 0 also holds when the income dominates the substitution
effect.
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penalty rates increases, the resulting drop in the share of evaders makes the social norm for
tax compliance stronger – the moral costs of tax evasion increase. This will trigger a further
reduction in the level of evasion. Hence, in our framework, the equilibrium impact of tax
enforcement is stronger than suggested by the partial equilibrium analysis, respectively the AS
model.
4.3 Beliefs and Multiple Equilibria
So far, we have considered the case where any (marginal) policy change results in a marginal
adjustment of n∗. In the context of multiple equilibria, however, this is not necessarily true.
Our analysis implicitly assumes (a) that there always exists a stable equilibrium in the close
neighborhood of the previous one and (b) that society indeed coordinates on this particular
equilibrium. The first assumption is fulfilled, as long as the stability condition from (18) holds
with strict inequality. Regarding the second point, one could argue that – at least for minor
policy changes – an equilibrium which is ‘proximate’ to the former one is more salient than an
alternative, more distant equilibrium. Following this line of reasoning, the equilibrium in the
neighborhood of the previous one becomes a focal point equilibrium (Schelling 1960). If this is
the case, (19)–(24) provide the valid marginal effects of the policy variables. If assumption (b)
is violated, however, these results can turn around.
To illustrate this point, assume that individual behavior is based on beliefs rather than the
true level of norm-violations. Let us denote a taxpayer’s belief about n at time t by bti =
b(nt−1, φt−1i ,P). Beliefs depend on the past level of norm violations, the policy vector P, as well
as a parameter φt−1i which captures an individuals specific perceptions at time t−1. We assume
∂bt/∂nt−1 > 0 and ∂bt/∂φt−1 > 0. Hence, with a shock in beliefs φt−1i > 0 a taxpayer tends to
overestimate the level of evaders. In equilibrium there holds φt−1i = 0 and b
t
i = b(n
∗, 0,P) = n∗
∀i. It is worth noting that in the absence of shocks beliefs would always adapt such that they
would be fulfilled in the long run, i.e. bti = n
∗ as t → ∞. Starting from any initial (off-
equilibrium) level n0 within the basin of attraction of one particular, stable equilibrium (e.g.
n ∈ [0, n∗m] for equilibrium n∗l in figure 3), the updating of beliefs based upon nt−1 will drive
behavior towards this equilibrium.
Let us first consider the case where stricter tax enforcement – e.g. an increase in the detection
probability – is announced at period t and there is no shock on agents’ beliefs (φti = 0). Starting
from an equilibrium n∗0, perfectly informed taxpayer would adjust their behavior according to
the new, weaker evasion incentives. The level of evaders drops, and so will agents’ beliefs in
the following period. The social norm becomes stronger, providing a further incentive to reduce
evasion. Society gradually move towards the new stable equilibrium n∗1 < n∗0. This case is also
illustrated in figure 4. Stricter enforcement shifts the θˆ(n)-curve downwards which reduces the
level of non-compliance in any stable equilibrium.
Consider now a scenario with belief shocks. More frequent audits are announced ‘as a
response to the high level of non-compliance’ and some agents take this as a signal that the
current evasion level is higher than originally believed. If their ‘mistake’ φti > 0 is large enough,
their belief after the policy change P → P′ fulfills bt+1i (n∗0, φi,P′) > b(n∗0, 0,P). Hence, these
agents perceive an increase in the level of norm deviations. The compliance norm becomes
weaker which provides an incentive to conceal more rather than less income. Given that this
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latter incentive dominates the direct effect from stricter auditing, the number of evaders would
raise among those with φti > 0. As a result, we might observe an overall increase in norm
violations, i.e. nt+1 > n∗0. Nevertheless, society would converge towards the equilibrium n∗1, if
(i) no further shocks occur (φt+1i = φ
t+2
i = ... = 0) and (ii) n
t+1 is still in the basin of attraction
of the equilibrium n∗1. In a society with many stable equilibria, however, each equilibrium’s
basin of attraction becomes relatively small. Already minor shocks could then be sufficient to
push nt+1 into the attraction area of a different equilibrium. In figure 4, for example, it would
be sufficient if nt+1 > n∗m which provides the upper limit of the basin of attraction to n∗1. If
norm violations after the shock overshoot this level, the system converges towards the stable
equilibrium n∗2 – an equilibrium with more evaders than before the policy change.
Figure 4: Response to stricter Enforcement – Belief Shocks
As this thought experiment shows, stricter tax enforcement can trigger more evaders, such
that the results from (22) turn around. This also renders the enforcement variables’ impact
on the actual level of evasion ambiguous: The negative direct effect from an increase in p or
s, depicted in the first terms on the RHS of (23) respectively (24), would work against the
positive effect from a weakening of the social norm, related to an increase norm-violations. For
evaders with a high norm-sensitivity θ, the latter effect is more likely to dominate the monetary
incentives for compliance.
As we have seen, policy adjustments in the context of multiple equilibria can trigger coun-
terintuitive behavioral responses, once we allow for belief shocks. The original incentive related
to a policy change are more likely to be turned around, either if shocks are large or in the
case where many stable equilibria exist. The immediate policy implication of this discussion is
straightforward: taxpayers’ beliefs matter! Hence, the management of these beliefs become a
policy tool. New policies should therefore be communicated in a way which either tries to avoid
shocking beliefs at all or tries to shock beliefs in a direction which supports the policy change.
Turning back to the example from above, it might be more efficient to announce increased audit-
ing efforts as a means ‘to further improve the high level of compliance’ rather than as response
to ‘a recent increase in tax evasion’. We will come back to the impact of belief management in
the following section.
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5 Social Structure and Inter-Group Spillovers
In this section we extend our basic framework and analyze a more complex structure of society.
In particular, we consider a population consisting ofM ≥ 2 subgroups. One could think of these
groups as local communities or social classes with similar education, income or social status. In
the following we focus on the case where individuals within a group j ∈ {1, ...,M} have the same
income yj and face the same policy Pj = (τj , pj , sj). The net income of agent i from group j
for the case of detected respectively undetected evasion is then given by
xaij = x
a
j (eij) = (1− τj) yj − τjeijsj ,
xbij = x
b
j(eij) = (1− τj)yj + τjeij .
The preferences are described by
vj (eij , θij) = E [u(x(eij))]− θij eij
M∑
k=1
αjk c(nk) (25)
with
E [u(x(eij))] = pj u(xaj (eij)) + (1− pj) u(xbj(eij)),∑
k
αjk = 1 ∀j (26)
and nk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of evaders in group k ∈ {1, ...,M}. In (25) we allow the moral
costs of evasion to depend upon the compliance behavior in the own as well as other groups
of society. The parameter αjk ∈ [0, 1) thereby captures the sensitivity of the norm strength in
community j with respect to norm deviations in group k. We exclude the special case αjj = 1,
where the norm is group specific in the sense that its’ strength depends exclusively on the
behavior within the own group. Hence, there always exists (at least) one subgroup k 6= j with
αjk > 0 which works as a moral role model or moral reference group for agents from j.15
5.1 Optimal Evasion and Social Equilibrium
Assuming that communities are large and policies as well as non-compliance levels are taken
as given, individuals choose eij in order to maximize (25). Analogously to (6), the first order
condition for an interior solution is
−pjsjτj u′(xaij) + (1− pj) τj u′(xbij) = θij
∑
k
αjk c(nk). (27)
The threshold for an interior solution becomes
θˆj(nj , n−j) =
zj∑
k αjk c(nk)
(28)
with zj ≡ (1− pj (1 + sj)) τj u′ ((1− τj) yj) > 0 and n−j = (n1, . . . , nj−1, nj+1, . . . , nM ). For
θij ≤ θˆj(nj , n−j), condition (27) characterizes the optimal evasion level e∗ij . All agents with θij
15If moral costs were shaped by the pattern of direct social interactions, we could relate αjk to the degree
of population segregation respectively viscosity (Myerson et al., 1991). If αjk is high, the interaction frequency
between types from groups j and k is high.
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above this threshold are in a corner solution and fully comply with tax laws.
We can now describe a social equilibrium for a society structured in M groups. Let the
degree of norm internalization within each group be distributed according to a continuously
differentiable, cumulative distribution function Fj(θ) with θij ∈ [0, θ¯] and the inverse F−1j is well
defined on the unit interval. A social equilibrium is then characterized by (n∗j , n
∗
−j) with
n∗j = Fj(θˆj(n
∗
j , n
∗
−j) ∀j (29)
and stability is given iff
∂F−1j
∂nj
∣∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j
≥ dθˆj(nj , n−j)
dnj
∣∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j ,n−j=n
∗
−j
∀j . (30)
Assuming that θˆj(1, n−j) < θ¯ holds for n−j = (1, ..., 1), there always exists at least one stable
equilibrium.16
In section 4, there was always one equilibrium associated with one norm strength for the
whole society. The extended framework now allows for equilibria where the perceived strength of
the social norm as well as behavior strongly differs between heterogeneous subgroups of society.
In particular, social structure and inter-group links could support social equilibria, where some
groups predominantly cheat on taxes while most members of other communities act according to
the norm. The model thereby captures what Lewis (1982, p.144) described as different coexisting
‘tax subcultures’.
5.2 Policy Spillovers and Belief Leadership
We now turn to policy changes within this extended framework. To simplify the formal analysis,
we consider a society with only two groups, i.e. M = 2. Let us first study an increase in the tax
rate for group j. As before, we can derive that
dn∗j
dτj
> 0 (31)
holds in any stable equilibrium.17 A tax increase still induces more people to cheat on taxes.
However, a higher level of n∗j now has a negative impact on the perceived norm strength in the
other group k 6= j and thereby triggers further norm deviations. In particular, we get from (29)
dn∗k
dn∗j
> 0. (32)
As taxpayers condition their compliance also on the behavior in the other group, norm deviations
within j create a spillover on community k.
The adjustment in evasion among members from the subgroup targeted by the tax increase
is given by
de∗ij
dτj
=
∂e∗ij
∂τj
+
(
∂e∗ij
∂nj
+
∂e∗ij
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
. (33)
16As c(0) is finite, there holds θˆj(0, n−j) > 0 for all n−j . This implies the existence of a stable social equilibrium.
17All results of this section are derived in Appendix A3.
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One can derive the partial equilibrium effects ∂e∗ij/∂τj and ∂e
∗
ij/∂nj > 0 analogously to the ones
presented in section 4. The impact of an increase in τj on the evasion level of agents from group
j is similar as before: Next to the direct impact on the monetary incentives to evade, higher
taxes will raise the share of norm violations within the own group. In turn, the compliance level
in the other subgroup will decrease as well. With a higher share of evaders in both communities
the strength of the social norm declines. Since ∂e∗ij/∂nk ≥ 0, this provides a similar second
order incentive to increase e∗ij as discussed in the previous section. In addition, however, the
group specific tax policy creates an externality on compliance in the other group:
de∗ik
dτj
=
(
∂e∗ik
∂nj
+
∂e∗ik
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
≥ 0. (34)
Although the change in the tax rate does not alter the monetary incentives of these taxpayers,
they react with an increase in evasion. As more taxpayers from the other community start
cheating, tax morale among the own peers – and thereby compliance – drops as well. Again,
this result is triggered by conditional cooperative taxpayers. In the basic framework this effect
occurred within one group – a homogenous society. Now it works between different subgroups
of the population. As a consequence, any group specific policy change will causes a spillover
on other communities within the society.18 The magnitude of the externality from a change in
policy Pj on the level of evasion in group k 6= j is determined by the social role a community k
plays for the members of j. The higher is αjk, the more weight is attributed to the behavior of
agents from k in determining tax morale within group j, the stronger is the spillover. Hence, the
more a group works as a moral reference group for others, the more crucial are norm violations
among that group.
This observation has several important implications. First, the behavior of those with high
social and moral prestige can have a huge impact on tax compliance in the rest of the population.
Empirical evidence which supports this conjecture is discussed by Hammar et al. (2005). They
also report on a study by the Swedish Tax Agency which found that “the most common argument
legitimizing tax evasion among Swedens is that those in leading positions in society violate the
social norms” (p.5). Second, the spillovers provide new arguments for optimal policy choice.
A revenue maximizing enforcement policy, for example, should ceteris paribus devote more
resources on auditing members from moral reference groups. Enforcing high levels of compliance
among these groups creates strong, positive spillovers and thereby yields high tax revenues.
Furthermore, the spillovers could also present a limitation for optimal redistributive taxation.
Given that social prestige is associated with higher incomes, our analysis suggests that taxing
the rich would also cause a decline in tax morale and therewith compliance in the rest of the
society. A thorough analysis of this tradeoff is left for further research.
Note further that the ‘leading groups’ in a society are typically rather small. Hence, the norm
violations of a few could then lead to a sharp erosion of tax morale within the whole society. We
could easily find examples, where rather small shifts in the behavior within a moral reference
group eliminate the existence of ‘good’ equilibria (with a high level of norm compliance) for
other subgroups. Some few tax evasion cases among ‘morale leaders’ – societies’ high-profile
18Note, that this analysis is based upon the same implicit assumptions as discussed in section 4.3. If we allow
for belief shocks, it becomes unclear upon which equilibrium a society would coordinate after a policy change.
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members like politicians – could then shift a bulk of the population from an equilibrium state
with a large extent of tax compliance to a state with widespread evasion.
The crucial role of leadership is also highlighted by recent experimental economic studies.
For example, Ga¨chter and Renner (2006) show how contributions of a leader (first-mover) in
a sequential public good game affect the followers’ beliefs and thereby their behavior. Higher
contributions by the leaders make followers expect higher levels of cooperation which triggers
more contributions among conditional cooperators. Similar evidence is discussed in Arbak and
Villeval (2006). Hence, these studies point out the role of belief leadership as one possible way
to manage beliefs (compare section 4.3).19
6 Conclusion
In order to design appropriate policies to ensure tax compliance, it is essential to carefully
examine taxpayers’ motivation to comply with tax laws. This paper studies the incentives related
to tax morale, interpreted as a social norm for compliance. As empirical research demonstrated,
taxpayers’ inclination to cheat on taxes crucially depends on the (perceived) behavior of their
fellow citizens. The more others evade taxes, the easier it is justifiable to conceal income. This
way, individual decisions become interdependent. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative, i.e.
they condition their compliance on the behavior of other members of the society.
As we have shown, our framework improves upon the classical tax evasion model in several
respects. We can explain rather high levels of compliance despite weak tax enforcement. As an
endogenous norm strength typically implies the existence of multiple equilibria, the model also
allows for different levels of evasion for one fixed monetary incentive to conceal income. In a
society which consists of several distinct communities, this implies the possibility of different,
coexisting tax subcultures. Finally, our approach also allows for a positive and thereby more
intuitive relation between tax rates and the level of evasion.
Next to conventional fiscal policy variables, the paper also discusses the role of belief manage-
ment. In a world of conditional cooperative taxpayers, it are not only the monetary incentives
which influence evasion decisions, but also individual beliefs. Any measure which corroborates
beliefs in high compliance levels therefore forms a potentially important policy instrument. Be-
lief leadership constitutes one tool to manage beliefs. As we have analyzed in the case of a
structured, multi-group society, the norm compliance in moral reference groups is of crucial
importance for tax morale in many other communities. If ‘moral leaders’ start to violate the
norm, strong detrimental spillovers on the perceived norm strength in the whole society can
occur. Hence, enforcing high level of compliance among ‘leaders’ helps to ensure compliance
among ‘followers’.
Recently, the applicability of belief management has been demonstrated by Fellner et al.
(2006). In a natural field experiment, they sent mailings to potential evaders of public broad-
casting licence fees and measured how many evaders started to pay the fees. Among others, they
compare the success of a neutral letter to a letter which contained information about the high
level of compliance with licence fees. Their evidence suggests that the information-letter was
more successful than the neutral one for individuals who experienced a positive shock in their
19The role of belief management is also discussed in Fehr and Falk (2002) and Ga¨chter (2006).
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beliefs about others’ compliance. Hence, their study highlights the use of belief management
as an alternative enforcement strategy. Clearly, further research is needed to study scope and
limits of belief management.
Appendix
A1. Appendix to Section 3 – Threshold Level θ˜
From (16) we can easily derive
θ˜(n) =
−τ2
c(n)
{
ps u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (A.1)
Using ρ (x), the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, rearranging and substituting for
(6), we get
θ˜(n) =
(1− p) τ2u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n) (1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i ))
> 0. (A.2)
Non-increasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient for θ˜(n) > 0 to hold, since from ρ′(x) ≤ 0
follows ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi). Note further that c′(n) ≤ 0 implies ∂θ˜(n)/n ≥ 0.
A2. Appendix to Section 4
Applying the implicit function theorem on (17) yields
dn∗
dp
=
− (1 + s) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1c(n)
∂F−1
∂n − ∂θˆ(n)∂n
< 0. (A.3)
where we used (7) to derive ∂z/∂p. As we know from (18), the denominator must be positive
in a stable equilibrium. This determines the sign of (A.3).
Following the same steps as before, we get
dn∗
ds
=
−pτ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1c(n)
∂F−1
∂n − ∂θˆ(n)∂n
< 0, (A.4)
dn∗
dτ
=
∂z
∂τ
1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n − ∂θˆ(n)∂n
> 0 (A.5)
with
∂z
∂τ
= (1− p (1 + s)) [u′ ((1− τ) y)− τy u′′ ((1− τ) y)] > 0. (A.6)
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Equilibrium Threshold θ˜∗(n∗) Substituting for (13) we can express (20) as
de∗i
dτ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n∗)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )− θi c′(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
}
.
(A.7)
The sign of the expression is determined by the term in the curly brackets. Using ρ (x) and (6),
we get the threshold
θ˜∗(n∗) =
(1− p) τ2 u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n∗)
(
1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− τ c
′(n∗)
c(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
) . (A.8)
For θi > θ˜∗(n∗) the term in the curly brackets is positive and hence de∗i /dτ > 0. Finally,
we compare this threshold with the partial equilibrium threshold, θ˜(n∗) from (A.2). As the
numerator of (A.2) and (A.8) are the same, but the denominator of (A.8) is bigger, it immediately
follows that θ˜ > θ˜∗ for any n∗. Moreover, from (A.5) also follows that the denominator of (A.8)
is strictly positive. Therefore θ˜∗(n∗) > 0.
A3. Appendix to Section 5
From (28) and (29) we can derive
dn∗j
dτj
=
∂zj
∂τj(∑
k αjk c(n
∗
k)
)2 (
F ′j(θˆj)
)−1
+ zjαjjc′(n∗j )
> 0. (A.9)
From (30) we know that in any stable equilibrium the denominator must be positive. As
∂zj/∂τj > 0, we get dn∗j/dτj > 0.
Implicitly differentiating (29) further yields
dn∗j
dn∗k
=
−zj αjkc′(n∗k)(∑
k αjk c(n
∗
k)
)2 (
F ′j(θˆj)
)−1
+ zjαjjc′(n∗j )
> 0 (A.10)
as the denominator must be positive in any stable equilibrium. Given that c′(n∗k) < 0, dn
∗
j/dn
∗
k is
strictly positive as long as αjk > 0. Since we assume αjj < 1, this always holds in the case of
two groups due to (26).
From the first order condition (27) we obtain
∂e∗ij
∂nk
=
θij αjkc
′(nk)
E [uj ]
′′ ≥ 0. (A.11)
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